年度	2011
全部作者	王文杰
論文名稱	股權分置下的中國上市公司治理 ——以控制股東為核心的檢視
期刊名稱	法學評論 , 122, 201-296
摘要	中國發展證券市場與西方發展證券市場的原始動機，存在著一個根本性的差異：西方國家將證券市場業作為籌措資金的平台，而中國將其視為國有企業經營機制改革的政策目標，致使中國證券市場上市公司向來都青睞於以國有企業改制為主。另一方面，為防止國有資產流失，而人為地限制國有股份之流通，形成了股權分置的特殊狀態，並在上市公司的股權結構中占絕對的大宗。股權分置，不但造就鮮明的控制股東現象，也固化了政府部門對於上市公司的長期行政干預。控制股東利用其控制地位侵害少數股東之權益，扭曲公司治理的有效運作。歷經二十年來的證券市場發展經驗，以及二○○五年公司法與證券法的修正補強下，在放寬政府管制的基礎上建立市場秩序，抑制控制股東掠奪，是中國上市公司治理朝向健全發展的道路。消解股權分置狀態，逐步對外開放，吸納借鑑有效的公司治理規範並作因地制宜的設計，加強司法機關的衡平角色都是不可或缺的途徑。 China’s initial motivation to develop its securities market is very different from that of the West. Whereas western countries regard a securities market as a fund-raising platform, China uses it as a tool to reform its state-owned enterprises. Therefore, the majority of listed companies in China are state-owned. In addition, to prevent the erosion of state assets, the Chinese government restricts the transferability of stateowned shares, which account for the majority of shares issued by listed companies. This Split-Share Structure not only creates the controlling shareholders but also enhances long-term government interference.Controlling shareholders have abused their power and misappropriated minority shareholders’ interests. Academics have long been urging the reform of corporate governance in China.Concluding from the 20 years of experience and the 2005 Amendment of PRC Company Law and Securities Law, the road to a healthy corporate governance of Chinese listed companies is to establish market rules by decreasing the government interference and restraining the abuse of controlling shareholders. Gradually eliminating Share Splitting, opening the market, adapting foreign experience and localizing corporate governance, and enhancing the role of the judiciary system are all of vital importance.
語言	中文